

SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: AN ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Background: Sustainability reporting becomes an accounting issue when information is expected to be reliable, comparable and subject to governance. The shift from narrative corporate responsibility reports toward decision-useful disclosure increases the importance of definitions, boundaries, evidence and internal controls. **Aims:** This article examines the mechanisms that connect the topic to organizational or policy performance and identifies the conditions that make those mechanisms stronger or weaker. **Research Method:** A structured narrative review integrates peer-reviewed research with authoritative policy, statistical, and professional sources, including OECD (2024a); IFRS Foundation (2023b). Sources are coded by outcome, mechanism, boundary condition, and practical implication. **Results and Conclusion:** The synthesis indicates that outcomes are heterogeneous. More disclosure does not automatically create more accountability. Long reports can obscure weak performance if metrics are selectively chosen, poorly controlled or disconnected from the decisions that allocate capital and set management incentives. Six recurring themes show that implementation quality, information, capability, and institutional context frequently matter as much as the headline policy or technology. **Contribution:** The article offers an evidence-based framework for finance functions, boards and sustainability teams that translates the literature into decision principles without claiming primary data that were not collected.

Keywords: Sustainability Reporting, Corporate Accountability, IFRS S1, IFRS S2, GRI, Accounting

Introduction

Sustainability reporting becomes an accounting issue when information is expected to be reliable, comparable and subject to governance. The shift from narrative corporate responsibility reports toward decision-useful disclosure increases the importance of definitions, boundaries, evidence and internal controls. This question is timely for organizations moving from voluntary sustainability narratives toward disclosures expected to be consistent, controlled and connected with financial decision making. Recent institutional and research sources such as COSO (2013); OECD (2024a) provide the broader context for the discussion.

More disclosure does not automatically create more accountability. Long reports can obscure weak performance if metrics are selectively chosen, poorly controlled or disconnected from the decisions that allocate capital and set management incentives. For finance functions, boards and sustainability teams, the practical issue is therefore to separate the part of the problem that can be managed internally from the part that depends on markets, infrastructure or public policy. That distinction keeps the analysis from turning into either technological optimism or policy fatalism.

The topic also has a measurement problem. Organizations tend to record what is easiest to observe, while the outcome that matters is often delayed, distributed across functions or affected by several causes at once. Knudsen (2020); ACFE (2024) illustrate why aggregate indicators are useful for context but insufficient for firm-level judgment. A good analysis must connect the indicator to a mechanism and then ask whether the mechanism is plausible in the specific operating environment.

Another complication is heterogeneity. Finance functions, boards and sustainability teams do not start from the same position. Size, skills, access to finance, technology, governance quality and market exposure all shape the capacity to respond. The same intervention can therefore be beneficial for one organization and premature for another. This variation is not a weakness in the literature; it is information about the conditions under which a practice is likely to work.

The article asks three questions. First, which mechanisms explain the relationship implied by the title? Second, which organizational or institutional conditions strengthen or weaken those mechanisms? Third, what can decision makers do without assuming that a single policy, technology or management tool will solve the entire problem? The questions are deliberately practical because the objective is to support judgment rather than to manufacture a universal formula.

The contribution is an integrative framework that treats performance as the result of interacting choices. It organizes recent evidence around six themes, identifies recurring tensions, and translates the synthesis into a set of actions for finance functions, boards and sustainability teams. The article does not claim original survey or experimental data. It is a structured evidence review intended for author development and editorial refinement before any formal publication decision.

Literature Review

The literature relevant to this topic sits across more than one field. Some sources focus on macro or institutional conditions, while others examine organizational routines, technology adoption or behavioral responses. GRI (2021); COSO (2013); IPCC (2023) are representative of that range. Reading them together is useful because a change in the external environment affects performance only after it passes through decisions about resources, incentives and implementation.

A first conceptual distinction is between an input and a capability. An input may be a technology, source of finance, policy instrument, data set or formal rule. A capability is the repeated ability to use that input well. The distinction matters for finance functions, boards and sustainability teams because adoption can be measured immediately, whereas capability often becomes visible only when conditions are difficult or when the organization must adapt without losing control.

A second distinction concerns efficiency and resilience. Many practices improve average performance by reducing slack, duplication or transaction cost. Yet highly optimized systems can become brittle if they lack alternative suppliers, skills, channels or decision pathways. The relevant question is not whether slack is good or bad, but which forms of redundancy protect important outcomes and which merely preserve inefficient routines. IPCC (2023); OECD (2024a) provide useful context for this trade-off.

Finally, the literature suggests that trust and information quality are recurring mediators. Managers, employees, customers, investors or citizens act on information only when they regard the process behind it as sufficiently credible. That observation links seemingly different topics: financial reporting, digital platforms, team innovation and public policy all depend on the quality of information and the legitimacy of the process through which decisions are made.

Analytical dimension	Central question	Practical concern
Materiality and reporting purpose	reporting frameworks differ in whether they emphasize investor decision usefulness, organizational impacts or both	teams can collect large amounts of immaterial data while missing information that affects key decisions
Organizational boundaries and data ownership	emissions, workforce and supply-chain metrics often cross functions and legal entities	unclear ownership produces inconsistent definitions and repeated manual adjustments
Internal control over sustainability information	non-financial metrics require documentation, approvals and evidence similar to other important reporting data	controls are often weaker because systems were built for management rather than external reporting
IFRS S1, IFRS S2 and connectivity	global sustainability standards increase emphasis on financially material risks and opportunities	separate sustainability and financial-reporting processes can create inconsistent assumptions
GRI and impact accountability	impact reporting broadens attention to effects on economy, environment and people	organizations may struggle to reconcile multiple frameworks and stakeholder expectations
Assurance, greenwashing and credibility	external scrutiny raises the cost of unsupported claims	marketing language can outrun the evidence available from operational systems

Research Method

The method is a thematic synthesis of scholarly and institutional evidence. The synthesis is deliberately transparent about differences in context, since studies conducted in different sectors or countries should not be treated as if they estimated the same underlying relationship.

The evidence base for this draft includes 8 core references covering research, policy reports, standards or official statistics. Priority is given to sources published from 2020 onward, with older references retained only where they are widely used to define a core organizational or accounting concept. The review does not use unattributed web commentary as evidence.

Each source is read against four coding questions: what outcome is being explained; what mechanism is proposed; what conditions appear to strengthen or weaken the effect; and what decision can reasonably be informed by the finding. The six analytical themes used in the results section emerged from that coding and from the problem structure defined in the introduction.

The method has limitations. Evidence drawn from different sectors, countries and research designs cannot support one causal coefficient for organizations moving from voluntary sustainability narratives toward disclosures expected to be consistent, controlled and connected with financial decision making. In addition, this editorial draft has not been validated with interviews or original field data. Its claims are therefore framed as a synthesis of supported mechanisms and practical propositions that should be reviewed by the named authors before publication.

Source	Primary relevance	Use in this review
IFRS Foundation (2023a)	general sustainability-related financial disclosures	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
IFRS Foundation (2023b)	climate-related financial disclosure requirements	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
GRI (2021)	impact-oriented sustainability reporting standards	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
COSO (2013)	internal-control principles and components	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
OECD (2024a)	structural conditions and policy issues in Indonesia	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
IPCC (2023)	climate science, mitigation and adaptation synthesis	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis

Results and Discussion

Materiality and reporting purpose

A useful way to read this issue is to start with the decision that managers actually have to make. Reporting frameworks differ in whether they emphasize investor decision usefulness, organizational impacts or both. That distinction matters because teams can collect large amounts of immaterial data while missing information that affects key decisions. In organizations moving from voluntary sustainability narratives toward disclosures expected to be consistent, controlled and connected with financial decision making, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including ACFE (2024); Knudsen (2020), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For finance functions, boards and sustainability teams, the practical response is to define users, decisions and material topics before expanding indicators. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

The point also has an organizational side. Reporting frameworks differ in whether they emphasize investor decision usefulness, organizational impacts or both, but the benefit depends on who owns the information, who is permitted to act on it and how exceptions are handled. A common failure mode is to adopt the visible part of a practice while leaving the underlying routine unchanged. Teams can collect large amounts of immaterial data while missing information that affects key decisions. This helps explain why organizations exposed to similar conditions can report very different outcomes. COSO (2013) provides a complementary perspective on the institutional or managerial conditions surrounding the issue. A more credible approach is therefore to define users, decisions and material

topics before expanding indicators, while documenting assumptions and reviewing them when conditions materially change.

There is also a boundary to the argument. Reporting frameworks differ in whether they emphasize investor decision usefulness, organizational impacts or both should not be interpreted as a universal rule or a guaranteed performance effect. Where resources, incentives or local conditions differ, teams can collect large amounts of immaterial data while missing information that affects key decisions. Short-term results may therefore move in a different direction from longer-term capability. This is one reason the present article favors conditional interpretation over a single average effect. Evidence summarized by IFRS Foundation (2023a); Knudsen (2020) supports the value of examining the mechanism and the surrounding context together. The managerial implication remains concrete: define users, decisions and material topics before expanding indicators. The quality of execution, not the label attached to the initiative, determines whether that principle improves performance.

Organizational boundaries and data ownership

The practical difficulty becomes clearer when the analysis moves from broad trends to the operating decision. Emissions, workforce and supply-chain metrics often cross functions and legal entities. The underlying mechanism is not difficult to see: unclear ownership produces inconsistent definitions and repeated manual adjustments. In organizations moving from voluntary sustainability narratives toward disclosures expected to be consistent, controlled and connected with financial decision making, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including OECD (2024a); GRI (2021), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For finance functions, boards and sustainability teams, the practical response is to assign metric owners, data stewards and review responsibilities. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

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Internal control over sustainability information

The evidence is less tidy than a simple positive-or-negative relationship would suggest. Non-financial metrics require documentation, approvals and evidence similar to other important reporting data. The point is especially relevant where controls are often weaker because systems were built for management rather than external reporting. In organizations moving from voluntary sustainability

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IFRS S1, IFRS S2 and connectivity

At firm level, the mechanism is usually more important than the headline indicator. Global sustainability standards increase emphasis on financially material risks and opportunities. The reason is practical: separate sustainability and financial-reporting processes can create inconsistent assumptions. In organizations moving from voluntary sustainability narratives toward disclosures expected to be consistent, controlled and connected with financial decision making, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including COSO (2013); GRI (2021), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For finance functions, boards and sustainability teams, the practical response is to align governance, scenario assumptions and reporting calendars. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

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GRI and impact accountability

One recurring lesson in this literature is that context changes the value of an otherwise sensible practice. Impact reporting broadens attention to effects on economy, environment and people. For managers, the consequence is immediate: organizations may struggle to reconcile multiple frameworks and stakeholder expectations. In organizations moving from voluntary sustainability narratives toward disclosures expected to be consistent, controlled and connected with financial decision making, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including OECD (2024a); IFRS Foundation (2023a), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For finance functions, boards and sustainability teams, the practical response is to build a crosswalk around material topics rather than duplicate entire reporting systems. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

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Assurance, greenwashing and credibility

What looks straightforward in a policy diagram is often more conditional in day-to-day implementation. External scrutiny raises the cost of unsupported claims. In operational terms, marketing language can outrun the evidence available from operational systems. In organizations moving from voluntary sustainability narratives toward disclosures expected to be consistent,

controlled and connected with financial decision making, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including ACFE (2024); GRI (2021), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For finance functions, boards and sustainability teams, the practical response is to use precise claims, documented methodologies and readiness reviews before assurance. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

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Integrated Discussion

Taken together, the six themes show that sustainability reporting and corporate accountability: an accounting perspective cannot be understood as a one-step relationship. The external condition or management practice changes incentives first, then affects behavior, process quality or resource allocation, and only after that appears in performance. When one of those links is weak, the expected result is diluted. This layered view is consistent with the broad evidence base represented by IPCC (2023); Knudsen (2020); IFRS Foundation (2023b).

The synthesis also highlights the role of organizational maturity. Finance functions, boards and sustainability teams with clearer data ownership, decision rights and review routines can often benefit from sophisticated tools earlier than organizations still struggling with basic process discipline. This does not imply that smaller or less mature organizations should wait indefinitely; it suggests that the sequence and scale of implementation should match their current capability.

A further observation concerns incentives. Many implementation problems that appear technical are actually incentive problems: people protect departmental targets, delay bad news, optimize visible metrics or avoid decisions whose accountability is unclear. Technical design therefore needs to be accompanied by governance that makes expected behavior and escalation routes explicit.

Finally, the value of standardization depends on where it is applied. Definitions, controls and core data often benefit from standardization, while customer responses, regional implementation or work design may require adaptation. The stronger approach is to standardize the principles that protect quality and then allow local variation in the method when that variation is visible and reviewable.

Managerial and Policy Implications

The synthesis suggests that management should begin with a small number of decisions rather than a large transformation programme. For finance functions, boards and sustainability teams, the first step is to identify the exposure or performance outcome that matters most, the information needed to judge it, and the person who is accountable for acting. This creates a baseline against which later investment can be evaluated.

The second principle is sequencing. Capabilities that improve measurement, role clarity and process discipline usually make later technology or policy interventions more effective. When organizations reverse that sequence, they often spend on tools first and discover later that data ownership, workflows or incentives are unresolved.

Third, leaders should make trade-offs explicit. The six themes point to recurring tensions between short-run efficiency and resilience, speed and control, access and protection, or standardization and local adaptation. A decision memo that states which trade-off is being accepted is often more useful than a dashboard that presents dozens of indicators without a decision rule.

Fourth, monitoring should combine outcomes with leading indicators. Outcome measures confirm whether value was created, while leading indicators show whether the mechanism is being implemented. The sources reviewed here, including GRI (2021); IPCC (2023), support the broader argument that capability and institutional quality matter alongside headline performance measures.

Finally, periodic review is essential. A practice that was appropriate during implementation may become unnecessary, too costly or too restrictive after the organization has learned. Review should therefore ask what changed, whether the original risk still exists, and whether the control or investment continues to earn its place in the operating model.

Priority	Recommended action	Reason for inclusion
1	Define users, decisions and material topics before expanding indicators	Teams can collect large amounts of immaterial data while missing information that affects key decisions
2	Assign metric owners, data stewards and review responsibilities	Unclear ownership produces inconsistent definitions and repeated manual adjustments
3	Map data lineage and introduce proportionate control activities	Controls are often weaker because systems were built for management rather than external reporting
4	Align governance, scenario assumptions and reporting calendars	Separate sustainability and financial-reporting processes can create inconsistent assumptions
5	Build a crosswalk around material topics rather than duplicate entire reporting systems	Organizations may struggle to reconcile multiple frameworks and stakeholder expectations
6	Use precise claims, documented methodologies and readiness reviews before assurance	Marketing language can outrun the evidence available from operational systems

Limitations and Future Research

The article is an evidence synthesis and does not estimate a new causal model. Findings from different contexts are therefore used to identify mechanisms and boundary conditions, not to claim that one effect size applies uniformly to organizations moving from voluntary sustainability narratives toward disclosures expected to be consistent, controlled and connected with financial decision making.

A second limitation is source availability. Institutional reports are valuable for recent context, while peer-reviewed research provides stronger methodological detail, but the two forms of evidence answer different questions. Future work should connect the framework with original firm-level, regional or longitudinal data and pre-specify the outcomes to be tested.

Research could also examine sequencing more directly. Many studies evaluate whether a practice is present, yet organizations may obtain different results depending on what was implemented first, how

long capability building tool, and whether supporting processes were stable. Longitudinal designs would be especially useful for separating initial disruption from durable performance effects.

Directions for Empirical Validation

The framework developed for sustainability reporting and corporate accountability: an accounting perspective would benefit from being tested against operational records rather than aggregate indicators alone. A useful empirical design would distinguish materiality and reporting purpose from organizational boundaries and data ownership and trace how each mechanism changes over time. Researchers should establish a pre-intervention baseline, document the timing of relevant decisions, and use outcome measures that managers actually monitor. Where a comparison group is feasible, matched organizations or regions would improve interpretation. Where it is not, interrupted time-series or carefully documented longitudinal case evidence may provide a more credible account than a single cross-sectional survey.

Sampling deserves equal attention. Findings associated with internal control over sustainability information may not transfer directly to settings dominated by ifrs s1, ifrs s2 and connectivity, particularly when firm size, institutional capacity, market exposure, or access to finance differs. Future studies should therefore report the characteristics of participating organizations in enough detail to make those boundaries visible. Rather than treating heterogeneity as a statistical nuisance, researchers can use it to explain why apparently similar interventions produce different outcomes. Subgroup analysis should be theory-led and specified before results are known, especially when sample sizes are modest.

Finally, empirical work should retain negative, null, and delayed effects. In studies of sustainability reporting and corporate accountability: an accounting perspective, pressure to demonstrate an immediate benefit can encourage overly narrow outcome selection. A stronger design would combine short-term process indicators with longer-term performance measures and would report implementation costs alongside benefits. Sensitivity checks, alternative model specifications, and transparent treatment of missing data would make the findings easier to assess. These steps would also help separate genuine effects from improvements that simply reflect better documentation, temporary attention, or changes in the external environment.

A publication-oriented test of sustainability reporting and corporate accountability: an accounting perspective should also document data provenance and analytical choices in a form that another researcher could follow. Variable definitions, exclusions, coding decisions, and changes made after initial analysis should be recorded rather than reconstructed at the end of the project. When confidentiality prevents public release of raw organizational data, authors can still provide a data dictionary, sampling logic, model specification, and summary diagnostics. This level of transparency does more than satisfy reporting conventions; it makes disagreement productive because readers can identify whether competing conclusions arise from theory, measurement, sample composition, or analytical choice.

Conclusion

This article examined sustainability reporting and corporate accountability: an accounting perspective through a structured review of recent research and institutional evidence. The central conclusion is that the relationship in the title is conditional rather than automatic. Performance changes when external conditions interact with organizational capability, incentives, information quality and implementation discipline.

Across the six themes, a consistent pattern emerges: more disclosure does not automatically create more accountability. Long reports can obscure weak performance if metrics are selectively chosen, poorly controlled or disconnected from the decisions that allocate capital and set management incentives. The practical implication is not to reject ambitious policy or management interventions, but to connect them to the mechanism through which they are expected to work and to the constraints faced by finance functions, boards and sustainability teams.

The review also points to a more disciplined use of evidence. Aggregate trends establish context, standards define expectations, and empirical studies reveal relationships, but none of these removes the need for local diagnosis. Decision makers should therefore combine external evidence with their own operating data and document where assumptions remain uncertain.

Future research can strengthen the framework by testing the proposed mechanisms with firm-level, regional or longitudinal data appropriate to the topic. For publication, the named authors should verify the source set, refine the contextual examples and add original evidence where available. That author-led step would convert the present editorial draft into a research article with a clearer empirical contribution.

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This document is an editorial research draft prepared from the title, author information and issue metadata supplied by the KISA Institute production list. The named authors should review the argument, references, affiliations, email addresses and any contextual claims before submission or publication. No uncollected survey, interview or experimental data are represented as author-generated evidence.

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