DRAFT FOR AUTHOR REVIEW

TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR AMONG MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISES

Nyoman Dwika Ayu Amrita, Anggun Yolistina, S.Kom

1 Universitas Ngurah Rai

2 Universitas Sangga Buana YPKP

dwika.ayu@unr.ac.id, Anggun_yolistina@gmail.com

Abstract

Background: Tax compliance among small firms is influenced by more than enforcement. The cost of understanding rules, keeping records, managing cash flow and using digital systems can be material for a business whose owner is also the main salesperson and operator. Aims: This article examines the mechanisms that connect the topic to organizational or policy performance and identifies the conditions that make those mechanisms stronger or weaker. Research Method: A structured narrative review integrates peer-reviewed research with authoritative policy, statistical, and professional sources, including OECD (2024b); OECD (2025). Sources are coded by outcome, mechanism, boundary condition, and practical implication. Results and Conclusion: The synthesis indicates that outcomes are heterogeneous. Simplification does not mean the absence of control. A system that is easy to use but perceived as unfair or weakly enforced can reduce voluntary compliance, while aggressive enforcement can discourage formalization when obligations are unclear. Six recurring themes show that implementation quality, information, capability, and institutional context frequently matter as much as the headline policy or technology. Contribution: The article offers an evidence-based framework for micro and small enterprises and tax administrators that translates the literature into decision principles without claiming primary data that were not collected.

Keywords: *Tax Compliance, Micro Enterprises, Small Enterprises, Tax Administration, Digital Tax, Fairness*

Introduction

Tax compliance among small firms is influenced by more than enforcement. The cost of understanding rules, keeping records, managing cash flow and using digital systems can be material for a business whose owner is also the main salesperson and operator. This question is timely for small-business environments where owners often combine operational, financial and tax responsibilities with limited specialist support. Recent institutional and research sources such as World Bank (2025); OECD (2024b) provide the broader context for the discussion.

Simplification does not mean the absence of control. A system that is easy to use but perceived as unfair or weakly enforced can reduce voluntary compliance, while aggressive enforcement can discourage formalization when obligations are unclear. For micro and small enterprises and tax administrators, the practical issue is therefore to separate the part of the problem that can be managed internally from the part that depends on markets, infrastructure or public policy. That distinction keeps the analysis from turning into either technological optimism or policy fatalism.

The topic also has a measurement problem. Organizations tend to record what is easiest to observe, while the outcome that matters is often delayed, distributed across functions or affected by several causes at once. United Nations (2024); OECD (2024a) illustrate why aggregate indicators are useful for context but insufficient for firm-level judgment. A good analysis must connect the indicator to a mechanism and then ask whether the mechanism is plausible in the specific operating environment.

Another complication is heterogeneity. Micro and small enterprises and tax administrators do not start from the same position. Size, skills, access to finance, technology, governance quality and market exposure all shape the capacity to respond. The same intervention can therefore be beneficial for one organization and premature for another. This variation is not a weakness in the literature; it is information about the conditions under which a practice is likely to work.

The article asks three questions. First, which mechanisms explain the relationship implied by the title? Second, which organizational or institutional conditions strengthen or weaken those mechanisms? Third, what can decision makers do without assuming that a single policy, technology or management tool will solve the entire problem? The questions are deliberately practical because the objective is to support judgment rather than to manufacture a universal formula.

The contribution is an integrative framework that treats performance as the result of interacting choices. It organizes recent evidence around six themes, identifies recurring tensions, and translates the synthesis into a set of actions for micro and small enterprises and tax administrators. The article does not claim original survey or experimental data. It is a structured evidence review intended for author development and editorial refinement before any formal publication decision.

Literature Review

The literature relevant to this topic sits across more than one field. Some sources focus on macro or institutional conditions, while others examine organizational routines, technology adoption or behavioral responses. OECD (2023); World Bank (2025); BPS (2026) are representative of that range. Reading them together is useful because a change in the external environment affects performance only after it passes through decisions about resources, incentives and implementation.

A first conceptual distinction is between an input and a capability. An input may be a technology, source of finance, policy instrument, data set or formal rule. A capability is the repeated ability to use that input well. The distinction matters for micro and small enterprises and tax administrators because adoption can be measured immediately, whereas capability often becomes visible only when conditions are difficult or when the organization must adapt without losing control.

A second distinction concerns efficiency and resilience. Many practices improve average performance by reducing slack, duplication or transaction cost. Yet highly optimized systems can become brittle if they lack alternative suppliers, skills, channels or decision pathways. The relevant question is not whether slack is good or bad, but which forms of redundancy protect important outcomes and which merely preserve inefficient routines. BPS (2026); OECD (2024b) provide useful context for this trade-off.

Finally, the literature suggests that trust and information quality are recurring mediators. Managers, employees, customers, investors or citizens act on information only when they regard the process behind it as sufficiently credible. That observation links seemingly different topics: financial reporting, digital platforms, team innovation and public policy all depend on the quality of information and the legitimacy of the process through which decisions are made.

Analytical dimension	Central question	Practical concern
Complexity and compliance cost	time spent understanding, calculating and filing tax obligations is a real cost for small firms	rules that are manageable for large companies can overwhelm owner-managed businesses
Record keeping and accounting capability	reliable tax reporting depends on separating business and personal transactions and maintaining basic records	digital filing cannot correct missing or inconsistent source records
Perceived fairness and trust	taxpayers are more willing to comply when rules and enforcement feel consistent and legitimate	visible unequal treatment can weaken voluntary compliance
Digital tax administration	pre-filled data, online filing and digital payments can reduce friction	poor usability, system downtime or fragmented portals can shift administrative burden back to firms
Cash flow and timing	small firms can be compliant in intent but constrained by irregular cash flow	payment dates that ignore business cycles can increase arrears and avoidance pressure
Enforcement and behavioral response	risk-based enforcement can focus resources on higher-risk cases	blanket enforcement may impose high costs on low-risk firms and erode trust

Research Method

The article adopts a policy-and-management evidence review. Sources are included when they contribute to the causal logic, implementation conditions, or measurement of the issue rather than merely repeating a broad definition.

The evidence base for this draft includes 8 core references covering research, policy reports, standards or official statistics. Priority is given to sources published from 2020 onward, with older references retained only where they are widely used to define a core organizational or accounting concept. The review does not use unattributed web commentary as evidence.

Each source is read against four coding questions: what outcome is being explained; what mechanism is proposed; what conditions appear to strengthen or weaken the effect; and what decision can reasonably be informed by the finding. The six analytical themes used in the results section emerged from that coding and from the problem structure defined in the introduction.

The method has limitations. Evidence drawn from different sectors, countries and research designs cannot support one causal coefficient for small-business environments where owners often combine operational, financial and tax responsibilities with limited specialist support. In addition, this editorial draft has not been validated with interviews or original field data. Its claims are therefore framed as a synthesis of supported mechanisms and practical propositions that should be reviewed by the named authors before publication.

Source	Primary relevance	Use in this review
OECD (2024d)	tax administration, digitalization and compliance systems	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
OECD (2025)	revenue systems and tax trends in Asia-Pacific	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
OECD (2023)	SME networks, resilience, trade, skills and technology	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
World Bank (2025)	financial inclusion, connectivity and digital safety	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
OECD (2024b)	digital technology, policy, skills and trust	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis
BPS (2026)	official Indonesian economic and social statistics	Used for contextual or thematic synthesis

Results and Discussion

Complexity and compliance cost

A useful way to read this issue is to start with the decision that managers actually have to make. Time spent understanding, calculating and filing tax obligations is a real cost for small firms. That distinction matters because rules that are manageable for large companies can overwhelm owner-managed businesses. In small-business environments where owners often combine operational, financial and tax responsibilities with limited specialist support, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including OECD (2024a); United Nations (2024), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For micro and small enterprises and tax administrators, the practical response is to simplify high-frequency obligations and use plain-language guidance. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

The point also has an organizational side. Time spent understanding, calculating and filing tax obligations is a real cost for small firms, but the benefit depends on who owns the information, who is permitted to act on it and how exceptions are handled. A common failure mode is to adopt the visible part of a practice while leaving the underlying routine unchanged. Rules that are manageable for large companies can overwhelm owner-managed businesses. This helps explain why organizations exposed to similar conditions can report very different outcomes. World Bank (2025) provides a complementary perspective on the institutional or managerial conditions surrounding the issue. A more credible approach is therefore to simplify high-frequency obligations and use plain-language guidance, while documenting assumptions and reviewing them when conditions materially change.

There is also a boundary to the argument. Time spent understanding, calculating and filing tax obligations is a real cost for small firms should not be interpreted as a universal rule or a guaranteed performance effect. Where resources, incentives or local conditions differ, rules that are manageable for large companies can overwhelm owner-managed businesses. Short-term results may therefore move in a different direction from longer-term capability. This is one reason the present article favors conditional interpretation over a single average effect. Evidence summarized by OECD (2024d); United Nations (2024) supports the value of examining the mechanism and the surrounding context together. The managerial implication remains concrete: simplify high-frequency obligations and use plain-language guidance. The quality of execution, not the label attached to the initiative, determines whether that principle improves performance.

Record keeping and accounting capability

The practical difficulty becomes clearer when the analysis moves from broad trends to the operating decision. Reliable tax reporting depends on separating business and personal transactions and maintaining basic records. The underlying mechanism is not difficult to see: digital filing cannot correct missing or inconsistent source records. In small-business environments where owners often combine operational, financial and tax responsibilities with limited specialist support, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including OECD (2024b); OECD (2023), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For micro and small enterprises and tax administrators, the practical response is to link compliance support with practical bookkeeping capability. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

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Perceived fairness and trust

The evidence is less tidy than a simple positive-or-negative relationship would suggest. Taxpayers are more willing to comply when rules and enforcement feel consistent and legitimate. The point is especially relevant where visible unequal treatment can weaken voluntary compliance. In small-business environments where owners often combine operational, financial and tax responsibilities with limited specialist support, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including World Bank (2025); BPS (2026), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For micro and small enterprises and tax administrators, the practical response is to explain rules, apply them predictably and provide accessible review mechanisms. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

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Digital tax administration

At firm level, the mechanism is usually more important than the headline indicator. Pre-filled data, online filing and digital payments can reduce friction. The reason is practical: poor usability, system downtime or fragmented portals can shift administrative burden back to firms. In small-business environments where owners often combine operational, financial and tax responsibilities with limited specialist support, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including World Bank (2025); OECD (2023), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For micro and small enterprises and tax administrators, the practical response is to design around user journeys and provide assisted support during transition. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

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Cash flow and timing

One recurring lesson in this literature is that context changes the value of an otherwise sensible practice. Small firms can be compliant in intent but constrained by irregular cash flow. For managers, the consequence is immediate: payment dates that ignore business cycles can increase arrears and avoidance pressure. In small-business environments where owners often combine operational, financial and tax responsibilities with limited specialist support, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including OECD (2024b); OECD (2024d), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For micro and small enterprises and tax administrators, the practical response is to use proportionate payment arrangements without weakening reporting discipline. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

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Enforcement and behavioral response

What looks straightforward in a policy diagram is often more conditional in day-to-day implementation. Risk-based enforcement can focus resources on higher-risk cases. In operational terms, blanket enforcement may impose high costs on low-risk firms and erode trust. In small-business environments where owners often combine operational, financial and tax responsibilities with limited specialist support, this can change the economics and timing of decisions even when the broad direction of policy or technology appears favorable. The sources reviewed for this draft, including OECD (2024a); OECD (2023), are useful because they place the issue inside a wider system of incentives, capabilities and constraints rather than treating one variable as sufficient. For micro and small enterprises and tax administrators, the practical response is to combine data analytics, education and graduated enforcement. That response is deliberately modest: it does not remove uncertainty, but it makes the trade-off visible and easier to govern.

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Integrated Discussion

Taken together, the six themes show that tax compliance behavior among micro and small enterprises cannot be understood as a one-step relationship. The external condition or management practice changes incentives first, then affects behavior, process quality or resource allocation, and only after that appears in performance. When one of those links is weak, the expected result is diluted. This layered view is consistent with the broad evidence base represented by BPS (2026); United Nations (2024); OECD (2025).

The synthesis also highlights the role of organizational maturity. Micro and small enterprises and tax administrators with clearer data ownership, decision rights and review routines can often benefit from sophisticated tools earlier than organizations still struggling with basic process discipline. This does not imply that smaller or less mature organizations should wait indefinitely; it suggests that the sequence and scale of implementation should match their current capability.

A further observation concerns incentives. Many implementation problems that appear technical are actually incentive problems: people protect departmental targets, delay bad news, optimize visible metrics or avoid decisions whose accountability is unclear. Technical design therefore needs to be accompanied by governance that makes expected behavior and escalation routes explicit.

Finally, the value of standardization depends on where it is applied. Definitions, controls and core data often benefit from standardization, while customer responses, regional implementation or work design may require adaptation. The stronger approach is to standardize the principles that protect quality and then allow local variation in the method when that variation is visible and reviewable.

Managerial and Policy Implications

The synthesis suggests that management should begin with a small number of decisions rather than a large transformation programme. For micro and small enterprises and tax administrators, the first step is to identify the exposure or performance outcome that matters most, the information needed to judge it, and the person who is accountable for acting. This creates a baseline against which later investment can be evaluated.

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The second principle is sequencing. Capabilities that improve measurement, role clarity and process discipline usually make later technology or policy interventions more effective. When organizations reverse that sequence, they often spend on tools first and discover later that data ownership, workflows or incentives are unresolved.

Third, leaders should make trade-offs explicit. The six themes point to recurring tensions between short-run efficiency and resilience, speed and control, access and protection, or standardization and local adaptation. A decision memo that states which trade-off is being accepted is often more useful than a dashboard that presents dozens of indicators without a decision rule.

Fourth, monitoring should combine outcomes with leading indicators. Outcome measures confirm whether value was created, while leading indicators show whether the mechanism is being implemented. The sources reviewed here, including OECD (2023); BPS (2026), support the broader argument that capability and institutional quality matter alongside headline performance measures.

Finally, periodic review is essential. A practice that was appropriate during implementation may become unnecessary, too costly or too restrictive after the organization has learned. Review should therefore ask what changed, whether the original risk still exists, and whether the control or investment continues to earn its place in the operating model.

Priority	Recommended action	Reason for inclusion
1	Simplify high-frequency obligations and use plain-language guidance	Rules that are manageable for large companies can overwhelm owner-managed businesses
2	Link compliance support with practical bookkeeping capability	Digital filing cannot correct missing or inconsistent source records
3	Explain rules, apply them predictably and provide accessible review mechanisms	Visible unequal treatment can weaken voluntary compliance
4	Design around user journeys and provide assisted support during transition	Poor usability, system downtime or fragmented portals can shift administrative burden back to firms
5	Use proportionate payment arrangements without weakening reporting discipline	Payment dates that ignore business cycles can increase arrears and avoidance pressure
6	Combine data analytics, education and graduated enforcement	Blanket enforcement may impose high costs on low-risk firms and erode trust

Limitations and Future Research

The article is an evidence synthesis and does not estimate a new causal model. Findings from different contexts are therefore used to identify mechanisms and boundary conditions, not to claim that one effect size applies uniformly to small-business environments where owners often combine operational, financial and tax responsibilities with limited specialist support.

A second limitation is source availability. Institutional reports are valuable for recent context, while peer-reviewed research provides stronger methodological detail, but the two forms of evidence answer different questions. Future work should connect the framework with original firm-level, regional or longitudinal data and pre-specify the outcomes to be tested.

Research could also examine sequencing more directly. Many studies evaluate whether a practice is present, yet organizations may obtain different results depending on what was implemented first, how long capability building took, and whether supporting processes were stable. Longitudinal designs would be especially useful for separating initial disruption from durable performance effects.

Directions for Empirical Validation

The framework developed for tax compliance behavior among micro and small enterprises would benefit from being tested against operational records rather than aggregate indicators alone. A useful empirical design would distinguish complexity and compliance cost from record keeping and accounting capability and trace how each mechanism changes over time. Researchers should establish a pre-intervention baseline, document the timing of relevant decisions, and use outcome measures that managers actually monitor. Where a comparison group is feasible, matched organizations or regions would improve interpretation. Where it is not, interrupted time-series or carefully documented longitudinal case evidence may provide a more credible account than a single cross-sectional survey.

Sampling deserves equal attention. Findings associated with perceived fairness and trust may not transfer directly to settings dominated by digital tax administration, particularly when firm size, institutional capacity, market exposure, or access to finance differs. Future studies should therefore report the characteristics of participating organizations in enough detail to make those boundaries visible. Rather than treating heterogeneity as a statistical nuisance, researchers can use it to explain why apparently similar interventions produce different outcomes. Subgroup analysis should be theory-led and specified before results are known, especially when sample sizes are modest.

Finally, empirical work should retain negative, null, and delayed effects. In studies of tax compliance behavior among micro and small enterprises, pressure to demonstrate an immediate benefit can encourage overly narrow outcome selection. A stronger design would combine short-term process indicators with longer-term performance measures and would report implementation costs alongside benefits. Sensitivity checks, alternative model specifications, and transparent treatment of missing data would make the findings easier to assess. These steps would also help separate genuine effects from improvements that simply reflect better documentation, temporary attention, or changes in the external environment.

A publication-oriented test of tax compliance behavior among micro and small enterprises should also document data provenance and analytical choices in a form that another researcher could follow. Variable definitions, exclusions, coding decisions, and changes made after initial analysis should be recorded rather than reconstructed at the end of the project. When confidentiality prevents public release of raw organizational data, authors can still provide a data dictionary, sampling logic, model specification, and summary diagnostics. This level of transparency does more than satisfy reporting conventions; it makes disagreement productive because readers can identify whether competing conclusions arise from theory, measurement, sample composition, or analytical choice.

Conclusion

This article examined tax compliance behavior among micro and small enterprises through a structured review of recent research and institutional evidence. The central conclusion is that the relationship in the title is conditional rather than automatic. Performance changes when external conditions interact with organizational capability, incentives, information quality and implementation discipline.

Across the six themes, a consistent pattern emerges: simplification does not mean the absence of control. A system that is easy to use but perceived as unfair or weakly enforced can reduce voluntary compliance, while aggressive enforcement can discourage formalization when obligations are unclear. The practical implication is not to reject ambitious policy or management interventions, but to connect them to the mechanism through which they are expected to work and to the constraints faced by micro and small enterprises and tax administrators.

The review also points to a more disciplined use of evidence. Aggregate trends establish context, standards define expectations, and empirical studies reveal relationships, but none of these removes the need for local diagnosis. Decision makers should therefore combine external evidence with their own operating data and document where assumptions remain uncertain.

Future research can strengthen the framework by testing the proposed mechanisms with firm-level, regional or longitudinal data appropriate to the topic. For publication, the named authors should verify the source set, refine the contextual examples and add original evidence where available. That author-led step would convert the present editorial draft into a research article with a clearer empirical contribution.

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This document is an editorial research draft prepared from the title, author information and issue metadata supplied by the KISA Institute production list. The named authors should review the argument, references, affiliations, email addresses and any contextual claims before submission or publication. No uncollected survey, interview or experimental data are represented as author-generated evidence.

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