INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS AND FRAUD PREVENTION IN PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING

Abstract

Background: Fraud prevention is strongest when controls are embedded in ordinary work rather than added after a scandal. Public organizations face a difficult balance: controls must be strong enough to deter and detect abuse, but not so cumbersome that employees create informal workarounds to get basic services delivered. Aims: This article examines the mechanisms that connect the topic to organizational or policy performance and identifies the conditions that make those mechanisms stronger or weaker. Research Method: A structured narrative review integrates peer-reviewed research with authoritative policy, statistical, and professional sources, including OECD (2024b); ACFE (2024). Sources are coded by outcome, mechanism, boundary condition, and practical implication. Results and Conclusion: The synthesis indicates that outcomes are heterogeneous. No checklist eliminates fraud. The effectiveness of a control depends on the incentives, authority and information surrounding it, and collusion can bypass procedures that appear sound on paper. Six recurring themes show that implementation quality, information, capability, and institutional context frequently matter as much as the headline policy or technology. Contribution: The article offers an evidence-based framework for public organizations and finance units that translates the literature into decision principles without claiming primary data that were not collected.